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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the diffusion of tax planning across firms, and the real effects and sharing of 
benefits from such diffusion. Using supply chain relationships among firms as a possible diffusion 
channel, we find that tax planning spreads from principal customers to their dependent suppliers. 
We find that tax planning diffusion has real effects on product markets and that both parties to the 
tax planning diffusion share in the benefits. As tax planning diffuses to suppliers, suppliers share 
the tax savings with their customers by reducing the mark-up on their products. Finally, we show 
that tax planning diffusion is more pronounced when the customer and the supplier share a 
common external auditor and when they are located in the same state, suggesting that these 
diffusion channels complement one another.    
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1. Introduction 
We examine the spread of tax planning across firms, a dynamic phenomenon that we refer 
to as tax planning diffusion. While researchers have made great strides in identifying 
characteristics of individual firms that are associated with firms’ own tax planning (Shackelford 
and Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Wilde and Wilson 2018), surprisingly little 
research examines how tax planning diffuses across firms. Even less is known about the real effects 
of tax planning diffusion and whether and how firms share the benefits from such diffusion. Two 
pioneering studies, Brown (2011) and Brown and Drake (2014), find that tax-planning strategies 
diffuse among firms with board interlocks. More recently, Gallemore, Gipper, and Maydew (2019) 
and Lim, Shevlin, Wang, and Xu (2018) suggest that common banking relationships and auditor 
relationships, respectively, can facilitate the spread of tax planning. Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and 
Zuo (2017) find that greater tax planning among firms in customer-supplier relationships, but do 
not examine whether tax planning spreads through such relationships. Moreover, none of the prior  
studies examine whether there are real effects of tax planning diffusion, nor do they examine 
whether or how firms share the benefits of tax planning diffusion.  
Rogers (2003, p. 11) defines diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.”1 The 
supply-chain network can be considered as one such “social system” in the Rogers’ (2003) 
innovation diffusion framework. In this framework, high frequency of interactions between 
customers and suppliers can cultivate an effective channel for the diffusion of valuable knowledge, 
particularly soft and tacit knowledge. Consistent with this observation, prior research suggests that 
 
1 In Rogers’ (1962, 2003) framework, which has been cited over 100,000 times per Google Scholar, diffusion is a 
special type of communication, in that the messages are concerned with innovation. An innovation is defined as “an 
idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003, p. 11). 
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down-stream partners are an important information source for innovation. For example, Isaksson, 
Simeth, and Seifert (2016) find a positive effect of customer innovation on supplier innovation. 
Chu, Tian, and Wang (2019) document a positive effect of customer-supplier geographic 
proximity on supplier innovation and a stronger such effect when customers are more innovative 
themselves.  
We posit that firms’ tax planning strategies are similar to technological innovations and 
thus they can diffuse among trade partners. To maintain supply-chain stability, principal customers 
have incentives to help their dependent suppliers remain financially stable, including by sharing 
their tax planning expertise. Moreover, principal customers may directly benefit if suppliers share 
some of their additional tax savings with them. We consider whether tax planning diffusion has 
real effects on the product markets in which firms operate. Specifically, we test whether the 
benefits of tax planning diffusion are shared by suppliers in the form of a lower mark-up on their 
products.    
Using both cash effective tax rate and GAAP effective tax rate measures of tax planning, 
we find evidence that tax planning diffuses from principal customers to their dependent suppliers. 
The results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, relationship fixed effects, and year 
fixed effects. In addition, a simulation-based falsification test with pseudo supply-chain 
relationships rules out the possibility that the results are spurious. We next investigate whether tax 
planning diffusion has real effects on the product markets on which the supply-chain relationships 
are based. Our results show that when suppliers’ effective tax rates decline because of tax-planning 
associated with their principal customer, they reduce the mark-up on their product prices, 
providing a direct benefit for principal customers to facilitate the diffusion of tax planning.  Thus, 
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the evidence suggests that not only does tax planning diffusion have real effects on product 
markets, but that the tax benefits are shared across firms.     
We then consider factors that could influence the extent to which tax planning diffuses. 
The first factor is the existence of a common auditor. In non-tax settings, prior research suggests 
that common auditors can serve as an information conduit between firms (e.g., Aobdia 2015; Cai, 
Kim, Park, and White 2016; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland 2016). McGuire, Omer, 
and Wang (2012) show that auditors with industry expertise appear to help their clients achieve 
lower effective tax rates and Lim et al. (2018) provide evidence that auditors facilitate the spread 
of tax planning among firms in China. Brown and Drake (2014) find that the effect of board ties 
on tax knowledge diffusion is more pronounced when the interlocked firms engage the same local 
auditor, suggesting that common auditors amplify the direct link between firms. Consistent with 
an amplification effect, we find that customer tax planning has a stronger effect on supplier tax 
planning when the trade partners share common auditors. The results are robust in both cross-
sectional tests and time-series tests involving auditor switches. The second factor we examine is 
geographic proximity of the firms. Prior literature suggests that geographic proximity facilitates 
the communication of soft information (e.g., Cannon and Homburg 2001; Costello 2013; Chu et 
al. 2019). We thus predict that the positive effect of customer tax planning on supplier tax planning 
is more pronounced when the trade partners are located closer to each other, i.e., in the same state. 
Again, both the cross-sectional results and the time-series results using headquarter relocation are 
consistent with the prediction.  
In a final test, we conduct an event-study analysis using the establishment of new supply-
chain relationships. We find that supplier firms’ GAAP effective tax rates and cash effective tax 
rates decline significantly after the firms establish relationships with a principal customer with low 
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GAAP and cash effective tax rates, consistent with the diffusion of tax planning knowledge from 
principal customers to their suppliers.  
Our study contributes to the literature on how tax-planning strategies spread across firms. 
Together with the findings of Brown (2011), Brown and Drake (2014), Gallemore et al. (2019) 
and Lim et al. (2018), our findings advance the understanding of how different parties that make 
up the firm’s operating environment influence tax planning, answering calls for research by Wilde 
and Wilson (2018) and Dyreng and Maydew (2018). Importantly, by linking the effects of tax 
planning diffusion to product market prices, our study answers calls for more research on the real 
effects of tax planning (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Wilde and Wilson 2018).  
Our study also contributes to the literature on the sharing of tax benefits. Shackelford and 
Shevlin (2001) and Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin (2015) suggest 
that effective tax planning requires the planner to consider the effects on all parties, which is 
sometimes referred to as the “all parties” concept. The idea is that tax planning generally involves 
(at least) two private parties and the government. If the private parties can work together to reduce 
their aggregate tax payments to the government, then even if the direct tax savings all go to one of 
the parties, both can benefit by adjusting some other aspect of their relationship. For example, 
prior research finds that when mergers and acquisitions are structured to provide tax benefits to 
the acquiring firm, the acquiring firm often shares some of its tax benefits with the selling firm in 
the form of a higher purchase price (e.g., Erickson 1998; Erickson and Wang 1999; Henning and 
Shaw 2000). Similarly, Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores (1992) build on the all parties concept 
when they examine compensation planning involving employee stock options. In our supply chain 
diffusion setting, we find tax planning spreads from principal customers to their dependent 
suppliers. While the dependent supplier benefits from the lower taxes, how does the principal 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503752
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213967 
 6 
 
customer benefit? We find that suppliers share the tax benefits with their customers by reducing 
the mark-up on their product sales. In this way, the customers have an economic incentive to 
facilitate diffusion of tax planning to their suppliers.  
In addition, our study contributes to the broader literature that examines how certain firm 
practices or strategies spread. A large body of prior research examines the diffusion of knowledge 
or practice via board ties (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2009; Stuart and Yim 2010; Brown 2011; Chiu et al. 
2012; Cai et al. 2014). In the supply-chain relationship literature, several recent studies examine 
knowledge or innovation diffusion among the supply-chain partners (e.g., Isaksson et al. 2016; 
Chu et al. 2019). We extend this literature by examining tax knowledge diffusion along the supply 
chain. This vertical (customer-supplier) diffusion channel is distinct from the board interlock 
channel documented in Brown (2011) and Brown and Drake (2014) as these two relationships 
rarely overlap (Davis 1996).2 
Following Cen et al. (2017), we examine firms in customer-supplier relationships. Cen et 
al. (2017) is limited, however, to simply documenting cross-sectional differences between firms 
in and out of such relationships. While Cen et al. (2017) conjecture that diffusion may be taking 
place in the sample, they do not test for diffusion. In contrast, we use relationship-level data (based 
on linked customer-supplier firm pairs) to understand the economic dynamics and channels of tax 
planning diffusion and how supply-chain relationships shape the tax-planning ecosystem. In 
addition, Cen et al. (2017) provide no empirical evidence on product market effects and whether 
supplier firms share tax benefits with their customers, whereas we do. Moreover, we examine the 
effects of common auditor and geographic distance on the spread of tax planning between 
customers and suppliers.  
 
2 Davis (1996) states that board interlocks among US firms mainly reflect the embeddedness in social structures (e.g., 
personal relationships), and they are seldom linked to vertical (customer-supplier) or banking relationships. 
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In the next section, we review related literature. Section 3 presents the data and variable 
measurement. Section 4 discusses the research design and main results. Section 5 presents some 
additional analyses. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Corporate tax planning represents activities or transactions that reduce a firm’s taxes 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). As with investment activities, successful tax planning can enhance 
firm performance whereas unsuccessful tax planning can decrease firm value, and different types 
of tax-planning activities can have different levels of inherent risks. Tax planning strategies range 
from low risk activities such as municipal bond investments to highly risky or aggressive activities 
such as tax sheltering (Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt 2013). Early research suggests that firms 
enjoy large returns to investments in tax planning (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew 1998). Despite 
the seeming benefits of tax planning, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) find considerable 
cross-sectional variation in firms’ tax planning activities. Motivated by this finding, a substantial 
body of research has investigated various firm or managerial characteristics that are potential 
determinants of such cross-sectional variation.3  
In a recent study, Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2017) investigate the 
systematic changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years. They find a significant 
downward trend in effective tax rates using a broad sample of publicly traded US corporations. 
Specifically, they show that the average cash effective tax rates of US firms have decreased by 
about 0.4 percentage points per year over the 25-year period from 1988 to 2012. The trend exists 
for both domestic and multinational firms and is largely unexplained by changing statutory tax 
 
3 See Shevlin (2016) and Wilde and Wilson (2018) for recent reviews of the tax planning literature. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503752
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213967 
 8 
 
rates, legislative or regulatory changes, changing firm characteristics, or the time-varying effects 
of firm characteristics on effective tax rates. These results suggest that there are wide gaps in our 
understanding of the spread of corporate tax planning.4  
Motivated by this and other gaps in the tax planning literature, Wilde and Wilson (2018) 
call for more research on how tax planning is influenced by the firm’s operating environment. 
Dyreng and Maydew (2018) make a similar call for more research on the workings of the 
ecosystem of tax planning. An important question in this line of inquiry is how do different firms, 
as members of a system, interact with each other in shaping the spread of tax planning across 
firms? Several recent studies provide us with some clues. Brown (2011) and Brown and Drake 
(2014) examine the spread of tax planning ideas through social networks. Specifically, Brown 
(2011) shows that network ties via board interlocks help to spread the adoption of the corporate-
owned life insurance tax shelter. Brown and Drake (2014) find that firms with greater board ties 
to low-tax firms have lower cash effective tax rates, consistent with information sharing regarding 
tax strategies among these firms. Gallemore et al. (2019) investigate banks as tax planning 
intermediaries and find that tax planning can spread among firms with common banking 
relationships. Lim et al. (2018) examine whether sharing the same individual auditor influences 
the diffusion of tax planning. They find that firms with greater connection to low-tax firms through 
audit partners have lower effective tax rates. Kubick et al. (2015) show that firms mimic the tax 
outcomes of their product market leaders. Bird, Edwards, and Ruchti (2018) and Armstrong, 
Glaeser, and Kepler (2019) find evidence suggesting that a firm’s tax reporting behavior impacts 
the tax reporting behavior of its peers. These findings imply that tax-planning ideas likely diffuse 
among corporations over time. Thus, it is useful to identify the potential channels through which 
 
4 Research on the sources of the decline over time is ongoing (e.g., Drake, Hamilton, and Lusch, 2019). 
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tax ideas spread. In addition, prior literature does not investigate the potential real effects of tax 
planning diffusion or whether firms share the benefits of tax planning diffusion. We fill this void 
using a supply chain setting.   
Specifically, we focus on the relationships between customers and suppliers and examine 
the diffusion of tax planning strategies along the supply chain. Several recent studies examine how 
corporate strategies or tacit knowledge diffuse along the supply chain. Isaksson et al. (2016) 
analyze knowledge diffusion in the supply chain network for the high tech sectors. They find that 
customer innovation has a positive and significant effect on supplier innovation. Serpa and 
Krishnan (2018) argue that a firm can learn from and adopt the efficient practice of its trade partner 
and they show that customers’ productivity has a positive and significant effect on supplier 
productivity. Chu et al. (2019) document a positive causal effect of customer-supplier geographic 
proximity on supplier innovation using exogenous variation in proximity caused by customer 
relocations. Our research extends this recent line of research by focusing on the diffusion of tax 
knowledge along the supply chain and the real effects of such diffusion in the product market.  
 
3. Data and Variable Measurement 
3.1. Sample and Data Sources 
Following prior literature (e.g., Cen et al. 2017), we use the Compustat Segments Customer 
File to identify companies in supply-chain relationships between principal customers and 
dependent suppliers. Regulation S-K requires companies to disclose the existence, names, and 
sales to principal customers that represent more than 10% of total revenue.5 Based on the company 
names disclosed, we manually match US-listed customers to their Compustat identifiers (i.e., 
 
5 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 (before 1997) and No. 131 (after 1997) also require firms to 
disclose the existence and the sales to principal customers.  
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GVKEY). Our sample consists of companies that report at least one principal corporate customer 
with a matched GVKEY. We restrict the sample to a 20-year period 1994–2013 over which 
companies’ effective tax rates can be consistently measured.6 In addition, we exclude relationship-
year observations where either the customer or the supplier is from the financial services and 
utilities industries, or has negative pre-tax income or book value, non-positive sales, or total assets 
of less than $1 million. Since we examine correlations of effective tax rates between customers 
and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be included 
in our sample. Our final sample consists of 11,051 relationship-years with non-missing variables.7 
Detailed sample selection filters are exhibited in Appendix I. As an example, we provide 
headquarter locations and auditor names of all publicly listed dependent suppliers for IBM in 2007 
in Appendix II. 
 
3.2. Key Tax Variables and Control Variables 
To assess a company’s overall level of tax planning, we use two effective tax rates: GAAP 
ETR (denoted by GETR) and cash ETR (denoted by CETR), where GAAP ETR is defined as total 
income tax expense divided by pre-tax book income less special items, and cash ETR is defined 
as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income less special items. These two measures are 
complementary: GAAP ETR captures tax planning strategies that result in permanent tax savings, 
while cash ETR captures tax deferral strategies that are not reflected in GAAP ETR. Both measures 
 
6 Two relevant regulatory events occurred in 1993: issuance of SFAS No. 109 (Accounting for Income Taxes) and the 
increase of the US statutory corporate income tax rate from 34% to 35%. 
7 As noted in Cen et al. (2017), the customer-supplier data structure is akin to a separate “hub-and-spoke” network 
topology, where each principal customer firm represents a hub and its dependent suppliers represent spokes. There 
are generally minimal intertwinements between different networks (centered on each customer firm) because a 
dependent supplier usually has only one or two principal customers and it is rare for a given firm to be both a principal 
customer and a dependent supplier. 
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are winsorized at zero and one.8  
Control variables are identified based on the existing literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; 
Dyreng et al. 2008; Rego 2003). Specifically, the following set of variables is included in our 
empirical model: return on assets (ROA), financial leverage, foreign assets, new investments, 
property, plant, and equipment, intangible assets, equity income in earnings, firm size, market-to-
book ratio, abnormal accruals, and cash holdings.9 The rationale is as follows: A firm’s profitability 
(ROA) can influence its incentives and needs to avoid taxes. Financial leverage reflects the amount 
of interest tax shield, which affects a firm’s marginal tax rate and its incentives for additional tax 
planning (Graham, 1996a, b, 2000). Multinational firms with more foreign assets have additional 
opportunities for tax planning (Rego 2003). New investments, property, plant, and equipment, 
intangible assets, and equity income in earnings contribute to a firm’s book-tax differences (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2010). Firm size and book-to-market ratio are two fundamental characteristics that can 
affect a firm’s tax planning. Abnormal accruals capture the potential effect of earnings 
management on book-tax differences (e.g., Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009). Cash holdings affect a 
firm’s incentives to avoid taxes: firms with more cash derive fewer benefits from cash tax savings, 
or tax aggressive firms may hold more cash in anticipation of potential disputes with the IRS (e.g., 
Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra, 2017).  
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of dependent and independent variables in our 
 
8 Our GETR and CETR measures require positive pre-tax income. To test the robustness of our results for the sample 
that includes loss firms, we use a cash tax differential measure developed by Henry and Sansing (2018), which is 
estimated as the difference between cash taxes paid and the product of statutory tax rate and pre-tax income, scaled 
by lagged total assets. Our results continue to hold based on this measure.  
9 Detailed definitions of all the variables are provided in Appendix III. Our inferences are unchanged when we include 
net operating loss carryforwards and change in net operating loss carryforwards as additional controls. 
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analysis. The average GAAP ETR is 27.4% for supplier firms, and 30.4% for customer firms. The 
average cash ETR is lower than the average GAAP ETR for both supplier firms (22.8%) and 
customer firms (25.5%). Supplier firms have an average ROA of 12.1% and an average leverage 
ratio of 15.2%. The average amount of foreign assets, estimated following Oler, Shevlin, and 
Wilson (2007), is 0.250. The average amounts of new investments, property, plant and equipment, 
intangible assets, and equity income in earnings, as a percentage of lagged total assets, are 9.5%, 
28.2%, 18.7%, and 0.1%, respectively. Average firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity, is 6.132. The average market-to-book ratio is 2.810, and the average 
abnormal accruals are 0.059. Supplier firms have an average cash holdings of 20.8% (as a 
percentage of lagged total assets). All these statistics are consistent with those reported in Cen et 
al.  (2017). 
 
4. Research Design and Main Results 
In this section, we empirically test for tax-planning diffusion along the supply chain. If tax 
planning diffuses from principal customers to their dependent suppliers, the effective tax rates of 
the customer-supplier pair should be positively correlated. In addition, we investigate the real 
effects of tax planning diffusion and whether suppliers share their tax savings with their customers, 
such that both parties benefit from the spread of tax planning across the supply chain. 
4.1. Correlation between a Supplier’s ETR and its Principal Customer’s ETR 
As a first step, we empirically test whether the effective tax rates of the customer-supplier 
pair are positively correlated.10 The dataset is organized at the relationship-year level, and the 
 
10 We focus on the contemporaneous correlation in this analysis. Our inferences are unchanged when we look at the 
lead-lag relation between a supplier firm’s effective tax rate at year t and its principal customer’s effective tax rate at 
year t–1.  
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sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective tax rates between 
customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to 
be included in our sample. The specification is as follows: 
Supplier ETR = α + β1Customer ETR + ГX  
     + Year Fixed Effects + Relationship Fixed Effects + ε,                  (1) 
where Supplier ETR is the GAAP ETR (GETR) or cash ETR (CETR) for the dependent supplier 
firm, and Customer ETR is the GAAP ETR (GETR) or cash ETR (CETR) for the corresponding 
principal customer firm. The vector X represents the set of control variables related to the supplier 
firm’s characteristics. We identify control variables following prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; 
Dyreng et al. 2008; Rego 2003), including ROA, financial leverage, foreign assets, new 
investments, property, plant, and equipment, intangible assets, equity income in earnings, firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, abnormal accruals, and cash holdings. We control for relationship fixed 
effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at both the 
relationship and the year levels. We predict β1 to be significantly positive. 
 Table 2 presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax 
rates on their customers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. Consistent with the diffusion story, we 
find a positive association between a supplier’s ETR and its principal customer’s ETR. In column 
(1) where the dependent variable is Supplier GETR, the coefficient on Customer GETR is 0.087 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (2) where the dependent variable is Supplier 
CETR, the coefficient on Customer CETR is 0.062 and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. ROA 
is positively related to GAAP ETRs but negatively related to cash ETRs. Firms with more foreign 
assets have lower GAAP ETRs and cash ETRs. Firms with more intangible assets and equity 
income in earnings generally have lower cash ETRs. Firm size is positively related to both ETRs 
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and market-to-book ratio is negatively related to both ETRs. The relation between abnormal 
accruals and GAAP ETRs is negative and significant. Finally, cash holdings are negatively related 
to cash ETRs. 
 To alleviate the concern that the positive association between a supplier’s ETR and its 
principal customer’s ETR documented in Table 2 is spurious, we perform a placebo analysis. 
Specifically, for each “true” supplier in the dataset, we find all pseudo supplier firms that belong 
to the same industry (i.e., based on SIC 2-digit industry) and same size quintile group.11 In each 
simulation test, we randomly pick one pseudo supplier to replace the “true” supplier. The test 
specification is exactly the same as that described in Table 2. We repeat the simulation test for 
1,000 times. In Table 3, we report the mean and standard deviation of key independent variables 
from 1,000 simulations, as well as the percentage of these coefficients that are larger than the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 2.  
 In column (1) where the dependent variable is the pseudo supplier’s GETR, the average 
coefficient on Customer GETR is 0.001 and the standard deviation is 0.015. Only 2.30% of the 
coefficients on Customer GETR are statistically significant at the 5% level, and none of the 
coefficients are greater than the corresponding coefficient reported in Table 2. In column (2) where 
the dependent variable is the pseudo supplier’s CETR, the average coefficient on Customer CETR 
is -0.004 and the standard deviation is 0.016. Only 1.40% of the coefficients on Customer CETR 
are statistically significant at the 5% level, and none of the coefficients are greater than the 
corresponding coefficient reported in Table 2. 
 Overall, the results in Table 2 and Table 3 suggest a significant, positive correlation 
between a supplier’s ETR and its principal customer’s ETR that is unlikely to be spurious. 
 
11 We conduct the placebo test based on pseudo supplier firms instead of pseudo customer firms because it is difficult, 
if not infeasible, to find firms comparable to the big customer firms such as Apple, IBM, Caterpillar and Microsoft. 
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4.2. Real Effects and Sharing of Tax Benefits 
While supplier firms clearly have a strong economic incentive to learn tax-planning 
knowledge from more sophisticated and mature customer firms, it is less clear why customer firms 
facilitate such a learning process. More specifically, what are the benefits to customer firms as a 
consequence of tax-planning knowledge diffusion to their suppliers? In this section, we investigate 
whether suppliers share the tax savings with their customers in the form of lower product prices, 
such that both parties benefit from the spread of the tax planning. The all parties concept of tax 
planning posits that private parties can alter other payments with one another to share benefits 
from tax planning that would otherwise accrue to only one of the parties (Scholes et al. 2015). 
Moreover, if the tax planning diffusion leads to lower product market prices it represents a real 
effect. 
 The dependent variable in this test, the supplier’s pre-tax gross profit margin, is defined as 
the difference between total sales and cost of goods sold, scaled by total sales. To obtain the two 
key independent variables, we first regress suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their 
customers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates and relationship fixed effects. This regression allows 
us to decompose suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates into two components: Supplier GETR 
(CETR) Explained by Customer GETR (CETR), which is the predicted value from this regression, 
and Supplier GETR (CETR) Not Explained by Customer GETR (CETR), which is the residual from 
this regression. Both components are standardized so that they have a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one. By construction, it is clear that the first component, Supplier GETR (CETR) 
Explained by Customer GETR (CETR), captures the tax planning related to customer firms, and 
the second component, Supplier GETR (CETR) Not Explained by Customer GETR (CETR), 
reflects suppliers’ tax planning unrelated to their principal customer. With gross profit margin as 
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the dependent variable, we include independent variables following Patatoukas (2011). 
Specifically, Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization; Firm Age is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the firm age; Sales Growth is the annual sales growth rate; Conglomerate is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two business segments; and Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. All control variables are lagged by one year. 
Similar to the main test specification reported in Table 2, we include relationship fixed effects and 
year fixed effects in this regression. Standard errors are clustered at both the relationship and the 
year levels.   
 The results of this test are reported in Table 4. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of 
Supplier GETR Explained by Customer GETR and Supplier CETR Explained by Customer CETR 
are positive and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This result suggests 
that, when suppliers reduce their effective tax rates as an outcome of tax-planning knowledge 
diffusion along supply chains, their gross profit margin also goes down. This result is consistent 
with the notion that the customer firms understand that their suppliers benefit from the diffusion 
of tax-planning knowledge along the supply chain. Instead of blocking such a learning process, 
the customer firms may effectively bargain for a lower price with their suppliers by actively or 
passively facilitating the learning process. In equilibrium, both customers and suppliers benefit 
from the sharing of tax planning knowledge.  
 
5. Additional Analyses 
If principal customers facilitate the diffusion of tax planning to their dependent suppliers, 
the positive correlation of the effective tax rates of the customer-supplier pair should be stronger 
when the cost of tax planning diffusion is lower. We use two variables to capture the cost of tax 
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planning diffusion: whether the supplier firm and its principal customer rely on a common auditor, 
and whether they have their headquarters in the same state. In addition, to establish the direction 
and timing of diffusions, we use a difference-in-differences approach around the establishment of 
new customer-supplier relationships. 
5.1. Common Auditors vs. Different Auditors 
Prior research suggests that auditors can serve as an information conduit in both tax (Lim 
et al. 2018) and non-tax settings (Aobdia 2015; Cai et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Thus, both 
supply chains and common auditors appear to be channels though which tax planning can spread 
across firms. We consider whether the channels appear to be complementary to one another. If 
common auditors also enhance the diffusion properties of supply chains, then we predict that the 
cost of knowledge diffusion will be lower for customer-supplier pairs with common auditors, and 
the positive correlation of effective tax rates will be stronger for those customer-supplier pairs. We 
perform both a cross-sectional test and a time-series test. 
Table 5 reports the results for the cross-sectional test. This test compares two subsamples 
of relationship-pairs: (1) the “Same Auditor” group includes all relationships where customers and 
suppliers have the same auditor throughout the entire relationship duration; and (2) the “Different 
Auditor” group includes all relationships where customers and suppliers have different auditors 
throughout the entire relationship duration. In the first two columns where the dependent variable 
is Supplier GETR, the coefficient on Customer GETR is 0.243 (statistically significant at the 5% 
level) for customer-supplier pairs that share a common auditor, and 0.058 (statistically significant 
at the 5% level) for customer-supplier pairs that do not share a common auditor. The difference of 
the coefficients on Customer GETR is 0.185 and statistically significant at the 5% level. In the next 
two columns where the dependent variable is Supplier CETR, the coefficient on Customer CETR 
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is 0.186 (statistically significant at the 1% level) for customer-supplier pairs that share a common 
auditor, and 0.030 (not statistically significant) for customer-supplier pairs that do not share a 
common auditor. The difference of the coefficients on Customer CETR is 0.156 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Overall, the cross-sectional comparisons in Table 5 show that the 
positive correlation of effective tax rates is indeed stronger for those customer-supplier pairs with 
common auditors. 
Next, we turn to a time-series test that focuses on customer-supplier pairs with changes of 
auditors. For this test, we add the variable Same Auditor and its interaction with Customer ETR to 
Equation (1). The specification is as follows: 
Supplier ETR = α + β1Customer ETR + β2(Customer ETR × Same Auditor)  
     + β3Same Auditor  + ГX + Year Fixed Effects  
     + Relationship Fixed Effects + ε,                                                  (2) 
We predict β2 to be significantly positive. Table 6 reports the results for the time-series test. 
The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all relationship pairs that have changes of same auditor 
status within the relationship duration, i.e., in some years, customers and suppliers have the same 
auditor and in some other years, customers and suppliers have different auditors. In column (1) 
where the dependent variable is Supplier GETR, the coefficient on Customer GETR × Same 
Auditor is 0.217 and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (2) where the dependent 
variable is Supplier CETR, the coefficient on Customer CETR × Same Auditor is 0.160 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The results in these two columns suggest that for a given 
customer-supplier pair, common auditors facilitate tax planning diffusion.  
In columns (3) and (4), we only include relationships where the changes of same auditor 
status are driven by the changes of auditors from the customer side. A principal customer, such as 
Walmart, can have more than 50 dependent suppliers (whereas a dependent supplier usually has 
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only one or two principal customers). Thus, a principal customer’s auditor change is more likely 
to be exogenous from a single dependent supplier’s perspective. Compared with the results in the 
first two columns, the coefficients on Customer GETR × Same Auditor and Customer CETR × 
Same Auditor are slightly larger and remain statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). Overall, 
the time-series tests in Table 6 suggest that the positive correlation of effective tax rates is stronger 
when a given customer-supplier pair shares a common auditor. 
 
5.2. Headquarters in the Same State vs. Headquarters in Different States 
Prior literature argues that proximity to trade partners facilitates the communication of soft 
information (e.g., Cannon and Homburg 2001; Costello 2013; Chu et al. 2019). As with the 
common auditor test, we examine whether geographical proximity enhances the diffusion of tax 
planning along the supply chain. We predict the correlation of effective tax rates between 
customers and suppliers to be stronger when their headquarters are located in the same state. 
Similar to prior tests on common auditors, we perform both a cross-sectional test and a time-series 
test. 
Table 7 reports the results for the cross-sectional test. This test compares two subsamples 
of relationship-pairs: (1) the “Same State” group includes all relationships where customers and 
suppliers have their headquarters located in the same state throughout the entire relationship 
duration; and (2) the “Different State” group includes all relationships where customers and 
suppliers have their headquarters located in different states throughout the entire relationship 
duration. In the first two columns where the dependent variable is Supplier GETR, the coefficient 
on Customer GETR is 0.196 (statistically significant at the 5% level) for customer-supplier pairs 
that share a common headquarter state, and 0.066 (statistically significant at the 1% level) for 
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customer-supplier pairs that do not share a common headquarter state. The difference of the 
coefficients on Customer GETR is 0.130 and statistically significant at the 5% level. In the next 
two columns where the dependent variable is Supplier CETR, the coefficient on Customer CETR 
is 0.147 (statistically significant at the 10% level) for customer-supplier pairs that share a common 
headquarter state, and 0.044 (statistically significant at the 5% level) for customer-supplier pairs 
that do not share a common headquarter state. The difference of the coefficients on Customer 
CETR is 0.103 and statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, the cross-sectional comparisons 
in Table 7 show that the positive correlation of effective tax rates is indeed stronger for those 
customer-supplier pairs that share a common headquarter state. 
Next, we turn to a time-series test that focuses on customer-supplier pairs with changes of 
headquarter states. For this test, we add the variable Same State and its interaction with Customer 
ETR to Equation (1). The specification is as follows: 
Supplier ETR = α + β1Customer ETR + β2(Customer ETR × Same State)  
     + β3Same State + ГX + Year Fixed Effects  
     + Relationship Fixed Effects + ε,                                                 (3) 
We predict β2 to be significantly positive. Table 8 reports the results for the time-series test. 
The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all relationship pairs that have changes of same state 
status within the relationship duration, i.e., in some years, customers and suppliers have their 
headquarters in the same state and in some other years, customers and suppliers have headquarters 
located in different states. In column (1) where the dependent variable is Supplier GETR, the 
coefficient on Customer GETR × Same State is 0.165 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In column (2) where the dependent variable is Supplier CETR, the coefficient on Customer CETR 
× Same State is 0.168 and statistically significant at the 5% level. The results in these two columns 
suggest that for a given customer-supplier pair, locating their headquarters in the same state 
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facilitates tax planning knowledge diffusion.  
In columns (3) and (4), we only include relationships where the changes of same 
headquarter state status are driven by the relocation of headquarters from the customer side. 
Similar to its auditor change, a principal customer’s headquarter relocation is more likely to be 
exogenous from a single dependent supplier’s perspective. The coefficients on Customer GETR × 
Same State and Customer CETR × Same State remain positive and statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (4). Overall, the time-series tests in Table 8 suggest that the positive correlation 
of effective tax rates is stronger when a given customer-supplier pair shares a common headquarter 
state. 
 
5.3. Relationship Establishment and Diffusion of Tax Planning Knowledge 
To strengthen our inferences about tax-planning knowledge diffusion, we next use a 
difference-in-differences approach around the establishment of customer-supplier relationships.12 
Because principal customers are much larger (and presumably more financially sophisticated) than 
their dependent suppliers, we expect the tax planning knowledge to diffuse from the customer to 
its suppliers. Relationship establishment is based on when a firm reports a principal customer in 
year t for the first time, where the relationship will last for at least 5 years.13  
Table 9 reports the impact of relationship establishment on the GAAP effective tax rate 
(GETR) and the cash effective tax rate (CETR) of suppliers. All tests are carried out in two sub-
groups depending on whether the effective tax rates of the principal customers are higher or lower 
 
12 In spirit, one can do a similar test around relationship terminations. However, relationship terminations usually lead 
to a devastating effect on suppliers’ operating performance (see Cen, Chen, Hou, and Richardson, 2018), which can 
make tax avoidance less relevant. In addition, Bauer, Henderson, and Lynch (2018) suggest that relationship 
terminations are likely affected by suppliers’ internal control problems, which may confound the findings given that 
internal control quality affects tax avoidance (Gallemore and Labro 2015).   
13 One caveat is that it is not necessarily a new relationship, just one that crosses the threshold for disclosure. 
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than their industry median in year t–3. We expect that principal customers with effective tax rates 
lower than their industry median are more likely to have tax planning knowledge to share than are 
customers with effective tax rates greater than their industry median. In this test, we only consider 
a five-year period around the relationship establishment, i.e., from two years before relationship 
establishment (t–2) to two years after relationship establishment (t+2). Year (t–1) is an indicator 
variable that equals one for the observation of year t–1. Year (t), Year (t+1) and Year (t+2) are 
defined in a similar manner. The Adj. GETR (CETR) is the difference between GETR (CETR) and 
the average GETR (CETR) of benchmark firms that are neither principal customers nor dependent 
suppliers in the same year. We require that the incumbent supplier and the benchmark firms must 
belong to the same size and GETR (CETR) quintiles in the same industry. We include the same set 
of control variables as those reported in Table 2. 
In column (1) of Table 9, we find that in a five-year period around the relationship 
establishment with principal customers whose GAAP ETRs are below industry median in year t–
3, the GAAP ETRs of dependent suppliers decrease by 1.4, 2.1, and 3.7 percentage points in year 
t, year t+1, and year t+2, respectively. However, when principal customers’ GAAP ETRs are 
above industry median in year t–3, as in column (2), the coefficients on the event year dummies 
are small and not statistically significant. We repeat the same analysis for cash ETRs in columns 
(3) and (4). In column (3), we find that in a five-year period around the relationship establishment 
with principal customers whose cash ETRs are below industry median in year t–3, the cash ETRs 
of dependent suppliers decrease by 2.0 and 2.1 percentage points in year t+1 and year t+2, 
respectively. In column (4), we do not find statistically significant results when principal 
customers’ cash ETRs are above industry median in year t–3.  
In columns (5) to (8) of Table 9, we use a difference-in-differences method to ensure that 
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the results are not driven by common industry trends or common factors that affect firms with 
similar size or similar tax rates before the relationship establishment. In column (5), we find that 
in a five-year period around the relationship establishment with principal customers whose GAAP 
ETRs are below industry median in year t–3, the adjusted GAAP ETRs of dependent suppliers 
decrease by 2.0 and 2.6 percentage points in year t+1 and year t+2, respectively. However, when 
principal customers’ GAAP ETRs are above industry median in year t–3, as in column (6), the 
coefficients on the event year dummies are small and not statistically significant. We repeat the 
same analysis for adjusted cash ETRs in columns (7) and (8). In column (7), we find that in a five-
year period around the relationship establishment with principal customers whose cash ETRs are 
below industry median in year t–3, the adjusted cash ETRs of dependent suppliers decrease by 2.3 
and 3.8 percentage points in year t+1 and year t+2, respectively. In column (8), we do not find 
statistically significant results when principal customers’ cash ETRs are above industry median in 
year t–3.  
Overall, the results in Table 9 suggest that the reduction in a supplier’ ETRs around the 
relationship establishment is conditional on whether the principal customer has a low tax rate. 
Suppliers establishing relationships with principal customers in the low tax group experience an 
effective tax rate reduction. Our difference-in-differences analysis confirms that our findings are 
not driven by industry trends or common characteristic-related factors associated with size or tax 
rates before the relationship establishment. In addition, the reduction of effective tax rates mainly 
happens in year t+1 and year t+2 instead of year t, suggesting that the diffusion of tax planning in 
the supply chain involves a gradual learning process. Taken together, the results suggest that tax 
planning knowledge diffuses from principal customers to dependent suppliers. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the diffusion of tax planning across firms, and the real effects 
and sharing of benefits from such diffusion. Using a large sample of supply-chain-relationship 
pairs, we find that principal customers’ tax planning has a positive and significant impact on their 
suppliers’ tax planning. This result suggests that suppliers, which are relatively small and less 
sophisticated compared with their principal customers, likely learn from the customers regarding 
the tax planning strategies they use. We also find evidence that suppliers share some of their tax 
savings with their customers in form of lower prices, such that both parties benefit from the 
diffusion of tax knowledge. By affecting product market pricing, diffusion of tax planning has real 
effects. We find tax planning diffusion via the supply chain is enhanced when customers and 
suppliers share the same external auditor and when they are located in the same state. This result 
extends prior research that indirect links (such as common auditors) and geographic proximity 
facilitate the diffusion of knowledge on their own. Our results show that specific channels (i.e., 
supply chains, common auditors) can interact with one another in a complementary way.  
Our findings have policy implications. For example, when evaluating the overall impact of 
tax policies, our results suggest that governments should not only focus on certain targeted 
industries or firms, but also should consider the effects on other parties in the supply chain. Finally, 
we encourage more future research on the identification of the channels through which tax 
planning spreads.    
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Appendix I: Detailed Sample Selection Filters  
Customer-supplier relationship-years within 1994–2013 where both supplier and customer firms are public firms with GVKEYs 58628 
     - Relationship-years where sales to principal customers are missing in Compustat Customer Segment File -12522 
= =46106 
     - Relationship-years where the entire duration is shorter than 5 years within the sample period -30084 
= =16022 
     - Relationship-years where there is no sufficient information to compute independent variables defined in Appendix III -1758 
= =14264 
     - Relationship-years where there is no sufficient information to compute either Supplier GETR or Customer GETR  -3213 
= =11051 
     - Relationship-years where there is no sufficient information to compute either Supplier CETR or Customer CETR -1096 
 =9955 
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APPENDIX II: Headquarter Locations and Auditor Names of Dependent Suppliers for IBM in 2007 
 
 
This figure shows headquarter locations of all publicly listed dependent suppliers (in yellow) of IBM (in red) in 2007. For the customer firm and all supplier firms, 
we provide the names of their auditors in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX III: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
Supplier GETR A supplier firm’s GAAP effective tax rate, TXT/(PI-SPI).  
Supplier CETR A supplier firm’s cash effective tax rate: TXPD/(PI-SPI).  
Supplier Gross Margin A supplier firm’s gross margin, calculated as the difference between total sales 
and cost of goods sold, scaled by total sales. 
 
Key Customer-Supplier Relationship Variables 
Same Auditor A dummy variable that equals one if customers and suppliers have the same 
auditor, and zero otherwise. 
Same State A dummy variable that equals one if customers and suppliers have their 
headquarters in the same state, and zero otherwise. 
  
Control Variables  
Customer GETR The principal customer’s GAAP effective tax rate, TXT/(PI-SPI).  
Customer CETR The principal customer’s cash effective tax rate: TXPD/(PI-SPI).  
ROA Return on assets, calculated as pre-tax income (PI) divided by lagged total assets 
(AT). 
Leverage Financial leverage at the end of the year, calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) 
scaled by total assets (AT). 
Foreign Assets Foreign assets, estimated following Oler, Shevlin, and Wilson (2007). 
New Investments New investment, calculated as Compustat (XRD+CAPX+AQC-SPPE-DPC), 
scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
Property, Plant, and 
Equipment 
Net property, plant, and equipment at the end the year, calculated as Compustat 
PPENT scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
Intangible Assets Intangible assets at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat INTAN scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT). If INTAN = ‘C’, then INTAN = GDWL. 
Equity Income in Earnings Equity income in earnings, calculated as Compustat ESUB scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the year, calculated 
as Compustat PRCC_F ×CSHO. 
Market-to-Book Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, calculated as the market value of 
equity (Compustat PRCC_F ×CSHO) divided by the book value of equity 
(Compustat CEQ). 
Abnormal Accruals The absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated from the performance-
adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 
2005). 
Cash Holdings Cash holdings at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat CHE scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  
Firm Age The natural logarithm of one plus firm age, i.e., the number of years since a firm 
appears in Compustat database. 
Sales Growth Annual percentage sales growth of the firm. 
Conglomerate An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm reports two or more business 
segments. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of dependent and independent variables in our analysis. The sample period is 
from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require 
that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be included in our sample. Detailed definitions of all 
independent variables are provided in Appendix III. 
 
Variables  Mean Median SD Observations 
Tax Rates      
Supplier GETR  0.274 0.309 0.168 11051 
Supplier CETR  0.228 0.207 0.196 9955 
Customer GETR  0.304 0.323 0.120 11051 
Customer CETR  0.255 0.261 0.150 9955 
Other Firm Characteristics of Suppliers      
ROA  0.121 0.095 0.097 11051 
Leverage  0.152 0.116 0.158 11051 
Foreign Assets  0.250 0.116 0.303 11051 
New Investments  0.095 0.054 0.146 11051 
Property, Plant, and Equipment  0.282 0.196 0.266 11051 
Intangible Assets  0.187 0.104 0.222 11051 
Equity Income in Earnings  0.001 0.000 0.004 11051 
Firm Size  6.132 6.185 2.104 11051 
Market-to-Book  2.810 2.055 2.649 11051 
Abnormal Accruals  0.059 0.040 0.062 11051 
Cash Holdings  0.208 0.124 0.240 11051 
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Table 2: Correlation between a Supplier’s ETR and its Principal Customer’s ETR 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective 
tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be 
included in our sample. Detailed definitions of all independent variables are provided in Appendix III. We control for 
relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered at both the relationship and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 (1)  (2) 
 Supplier GETR  Supplier CETR 
Customer GETR 0.087***   
 (3.76)   
Customer CETR   0.062*** 
   (3.31) 
ROA 0.300***  -0.154*** 
 (7.70)  (-3.66) 
Leverage 0.019  0.001 
 (0.77)  (0.04) 
Foreign Assets -0.056***  -0.069** 
 (-2.77)  (-2.57) 
New Investments -0.019  0.117*** 
 (-0.98)  (4.85) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 0.024  -0.012 
 (1.11)  (-0.44) 
Intangible Assets -0.020  -0.095*** 
 (-1.12)  (-4.30) 
Equity Income in Earnings -0.983  -3.307*** 
 (-1.14)  (-3.92) 
Firm Size 0.021***  0.049*** 
 (4.99)  (9.56) 
Market-to-Book -0.005***  -0.003* 
 (-4.34)  (-1.79) 
Abnormal Accruals -0.081**  0.048 
 (-1.99)  (0.98) 
Cash Holdings -0.027  -0.047** 
 (-1.63)  (-2.39) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Observations 11,051  9,955 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423  0.336 
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Table 3: Simulations with Pseudo Suppliers 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of pseudo suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their 
customers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. For each “true” supplier in the 
dataset, we find all pseudo supplier firms that belong to the same industry (i.e., based on SIC 2-digit industry) and 
same size quintile group. In each simulation test, we randomly pick one pseudo supplier to replace the “true” supplier. 
The test specification is exactly the same as that described in Table 2. We repeat the simulation test for 1,000 times. 
We report the mean and standard deviation of the coefficients on key independent variables from 1,000 simulations. 
We also report the percentage of these coefficients that are larger than the corresponding coefficients in Table 2.  
Statistics for Coefficients of  (1)  (2) 
1,000 Simulations Coef of Customer GETR  Coef of Customer CETR 
Mean 0.001  -0.004 
Standard Deviation 0.015  0.016 
% Positive Sig (5% level) 2.30%  1.40% 
%>True Coefficient 0.00%  0.00% 
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Table 4: Sharing of Tax Benefits via Product Prices 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ gross margin on the decomposed suppliers’ GAAP 
(cash) effective tax rates explained and unexplained by their customers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample 
period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective tax rates between customers and suppliers, 
we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be included in our sample. The dependent 
variable, the gross margin of supplier firms, is the difference between total sales and cost of goods sold, scaled by 
total sales. We first regress suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax 
rates with relationship fixed effects and decompose suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates into two parts. Supplier 
GETR (CETR) Explained by Customer GETR (CETR) is the predicted value and Supplier GETR (CETR) Not 
Explained by Customer GETR (CETR) is the residual from this regression. Detailed definitions of other independent 
variables are provided in Appendix III. We control for relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects in all 
specifications. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the relationship and the 
year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-
tailed tests, respectively. 
 Supplier Gross Margin 
  (1) (2) 
Supplier GETR Explained by Customer GETR 0.004**  
 (2.23)  
Supplier GETR Not Explained by Customer GETR -0.001  
 (-0.88)  
Supplier CETR Explained by Customer CETR  0.017*** 
  (9.49) 
Supplier CETR Not Explained by Customer CETR  -0.001* 
  (-1.68) 
Firm Size 0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (7.64) (7.26) 
Firm Age -0.016** -0.005 
 (-2.32) (-0.70) 
Sales Growth 0.004 0.004 
 (1.03) (0.92) 
Conglomerate -0.004 -0.006 
 (-1.11) (-1.42) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.09) (-0.15) 
Relationship Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,051 9,955 
Adjusted R-squared 0.819 0.827 
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Table 5: Tax Planning Diffusion and Common Auditors vs. Different Auditors 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective 
tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be 
included in our sample. This test compares two subsamples of relationship-pairs: (1) the “Same Auditor” group 
includes all relationships where customers and suppliers have the same auditor throughout the entire relationship 
duration; and (2) the “Different Auditor” group includes all relationships where customers and suppliers have different 
auditors throughout the entire relationship duration. Detailed definitions of all independent variables are provided in 
Appendix III. We control for relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the relationship and the year levels. The superscripts ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 Supplier GETR Supplier CETR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Same 
Auditor 
Different  
Auditor 
Same 
Auditor 
Different  
Auditor 
Customer GETR 0.243** 0.058**   
 (2.42) (2.09)   
Customer CETR   0.186*** 0.030 
   (3.19) (1.42) 
ROA 0.376*** 0.285*** -0.127 -0.167*** 
 (3.07) (6.34) (-1.08) (-3.49) 
Leverage -0.010 0.026 0.123* -0.039 
 (-0.17) (0.85) (1.71) (-0.92) 
Foreign Assets -0.068 -0.059** -0.066 -0.066** 
 (-1.16) (-2.34) (-1.38) (-2.05) 
New Investments -0.012 -0.028 0.135** 0.111*** 
 (-0.15) (-1.27) (2.22) (3.82) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment -0.005 0.029 -0.034 -0.001 
 (-0.06) (1.07) (-0.47) (-0.03) 
Intangible Assets 0.010 -0.012 -0.177*** -0.071*** 
 (0.21) (-0.58) (-3.19) (-2.70) 
Equity Income in Earnings -0.182 -1.231 -4.484* -3.153*** 
 (-0.06) (-1.20) (-1.89) (-2.94) 
Firm Size 0.006 0.018*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 
 (0.52) (3.74) (3.77) (8.29) 
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.71) (-3.71) (0.33) (-1.54) 
Abnormal Accruals -0.043 -0.104** 0.361** 0.006 
 (-0.32) (-2.30) (2.40) (0.10) 
Cash Holdings 0.046 -0.034* -0.062 -0.056*** 
 (1.07) (-1.82) (-1.21) (-2.76) 
Difference 0.185** 0.156*** 
(p-value) (0.043) (0.004) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,196 8,314 1,090 7,536 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.431 0.444 0.331 
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Table 6: Tax Planning Diffusion and Change of Same Auditor Status 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective 
tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be 
included in our sample. The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all relationship pairs that have changes of same 
auditor status within the relationship duration, i.e., in some years, customers and suppliers have the same auditor and 
in some other years, customers and suppliers have different auditors. In columns (3) and (4), we only include 
relationships where the changes of same auditor status are driven by the changes of auditors from the customer side. 
Detailed definitions of all independent variables are provided in Appendix III. We control for relationship fixed effects 
and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both 
the relationship and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 All Changes  Changes Driven by Customers 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Supplier GETR Supplier CETR  Supplier GETR Supplier CETR 
Customer GETR 0.029   0.016  
 (0.52)   (0.15)  
Customer GETR × Same Auditor 0.217***   0.253**  
 (2.97)   (2.20)  
Customer CETR  0.036   -0.049 
  (0.48)   (-0.70) 
Customer CETR × Same Auditor  0.160**   0.224*** 
  (2.19)   (2.93) 
Same Auditor -0.055** -0.012  -0.065 -0.019 
 (-2.04) (-0.44)  (-1.43) (-0.50) 
ROA 0.312*** -0.136  0.364** -0.239 
 (3.26) (-1.17)  (2.22) (-1.31) 
Leverage -0.002 0.082  -0.048 0.142 
 (-0.04) (0.91)  (-0.50) (0.77) 
Foreign Assets -0.026 -0.084  -0.062 -0.186** 
 (-0.63) (-1.27)  (-1.14) (-2.11) 
New Investments 0.021 0.113**  0.049 0.144 
 (0.49) (2.08)  (0.59) (1.47) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 0.013 -0.018  -0.017 0.023 
 (0.35) (-0.43)  (-0.21) (0.27) 
Intangible Assets -0.054 -0.130***  -0.100 -0.170 
 (-1.08) (-2.65)  (-1.06) (-1.55) 
Equity Income in Earnings -0.258 -4.005***  1.085 -5.565*** 
 (-0.15) (-2.67)  (0.43) (-2.91) 
Firm Size 0.034*** 0.040***  0.036** 0.030 
 (3.75) (3.36)  (2.11) (1.41) 
Market-to-Book -0.007** -0.003  -0.008 -0.006 
 (-2.08) (-0.96)  (-1.59) (-1.13) 
Abnormal Accruals 0.012 0.110  -0.225 0.286 
 (0.10) (0.75)  (-1.12) (0.83) 
Cash Holdings -0.035 -0.004  -0.020 0.077 
 (-0.77) (-0.07)  (-0.30) (0.57) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,541 1,329  693 546 
Adjusted R-squared 0.356 0.289  0.374 0.322 
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Table 7: Tax Planning Diffusion and Headquarters in the Same State vs. Headquarters in 
Different States 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective 
tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be 
included in our sample. This test compares two subsamples of relationship-pairs: (1) the “Same State” group includes 
all relationships where customers and suppliers have their headquarters located in the same state throughout the entire 
relationship duration; and (2) the “Different State” group includes all relationships where customers and suppliers 
have their headquarters located in different states throughout the entire relationship duration. Detailed definitions of 
all independent variables are provided in Appendix III. We control for relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects 
in all specifications. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the relationship and 
the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-
tailed tests, respectively. 
 Supplier GETR Supplier CETR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Same 
State 
Different  
State 
Same 
State 
Different  
State 
Customer GETR 0.196** 0.066***   
 (2.38) (2.72)   
Customer CETR   0.147* 0.044** 
   (1.94) (2.19) 
ROA 0.339*** 0.313*** -0.357*** -0.103** 
 (3.23) (7.35) (-2.64) (-2.37) 
Leverage -0.013 0.016 -0.135 0.014 
 (-0.20) (0.57) (-1.32) (0.39) 
Foreign Assets -0.042 -0.050** -0.006 -0.063** 
 (-0.79) (-2.24) (-0.08) (-2.17) 
New Investments 0.033 -0.031 0.128* 0.112*** 
 (0.72) (-1.47) (1.80) (4.48) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 0.051 0.016 -0.048 -0.009 
 (0.97) (0.64) (-0.83) (-0.30) 
Intangible Assets -0.035 -0.022 0.009 -0.118*** 
 (-0.78) (-1.08) (0.14) (-4.99) 
Equity Income in Earnings -1.868 -1.157 -1.588 -3.327*** 
 (-0.57) (-1.24) (-0.47) (-4.00) 
Firm Size 0.021 0.021*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 
 (1.62) (4.60) (3.21) (9.10) 
Market-to-Book -0.007** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.003* 
 (-2.12) (-3.80) (-0.05) (-1.74) 
Abnormal Accruals -0.120 -0.078* -0.070 0.058 
 (-1.06) (-1.75) (-0.41) (1.13) 
Cash Holdings 0.003 -0.034* -0.045 -0.050** 
 (0.08) (-1.83) (-1.12) (-2.27) 
Difference 0.130** 0.103** 
(p-value) (0.018) (0.027) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,099 9,633 1,041 8,617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 0.421 0.342 0.339 
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Table 8: Tax Planning Diffusion and Change of Same Headquarter State Status 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of suppliers’ GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on their customers’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates. The sample period is from 1994 to 2013. Since we examine correlations of effective 
tax rates between customers and suppliers, we require that a customer-supplier relationship must last for 5 years to be 
included in our sample. The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all relationship pairs that have changes of same 
state status within the relationship duration, i.e., in some years, customers and suppliers have their headquarters in the 
same state and in some other years, customers and suppliers have headquarters located in different states. In columns 
(3) and (4), we only include relationships where the changes of same headquarter state status are driven by the 
relocation of headquarters from the customer side. Detailed definitions of all independent variables are provided in 
Appendix III. We control for relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the relationship and the year levels. The superscripts ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 All Changes  Changes Driven by Customers 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Supplier GETR Supplier CETR  Supplier GETR Supplier CETR 
Customer GETR -0.037 -0.090    
 (-1.29) (-1.25)    
Customer GETR × Same State 0.165*** 0.168**    
 (2.81) (2.02)    
Customer CETR    -0.050 0.033 
    (-0.74) (0.18) 
Customer CETR × Same State    0.164* 0.152** 
    (1.77) (2.27) 
Same State -0.097 -0.022  0.010 0.082 
 (-1.58) (-0.40)  (0.35) (1.16) 
ROA -0.148 -0.777***  -0.233 -0.714** 
 (-0.81) (-3.20)  (-1.38) (-2.45) 
Leverage 0.088 0.057  0.287 -0.197 
 (0.57) (0.26)  (1.20) (-0.87) 
Foreign Assets -0.163** -0.211**  -0.164** -0.226** 
 (-2.30) (-2.67)  (-2.28) (-2.71) 
New Investments 0.114 0.179  0.014 0.036 
 (0.74) (1.14)  (0.18) (0.23) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 0.026 0.080  0.025 0.296 
 (0.21) (0.45)  (0.16) (1.27) 
Intangible Assets -0.015 -0.016  -0.110 0.126 
 (-0.15) (-0.15)  (-0.83) (1.18) 
Equity Income in Earnings 0.950 -7.962  2.716 -8.876 
 (0.42) (-1.27)  (1.10) (-1.29) 
Firm Size 0.017 0.049***  0.024* 0.036 
 (1.26) (2.70)  (1.89) (1.61) 
Market-to-Book -0.004 -0.010  -0.002 -0.011* 
 (-1.06) (-1.66)  (-0.82) (-1.87) 
Abnormal Accruals 0.148 0.311  0.214 0.364 
 (0.60) (0.83)  (0.84) (0.94) 
Cash Holdings 0.080 0.076  0.076 0.089 
 (0.79) (0.89)  (0.88) (0.99) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 319 297  219 200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.356 0.285  0.509 0.303 
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Table 9: Relationship Establishment and Diffusion of Tax Planning   
This table reports the impact of relationship establishment on the GAAP effective tax rate (GETR) and the cash effective tax rate (CETR) of suppliers. The sample 
period is from 1994 to 2013. Relationship establishment is based on when a firm reports a principal customer in year t for the first time where the relationship will 
last for at least 5 years. In this test, we only consider a five-year period around the relationship establishment, i.e., from two years before relationship establishment 
(t–2) to two years after relationship establishment (t+2). Year (t–1) is an indicator variable that equals to one for the year t–1 observation. Year (t), Year (t+1) and 
Year (t+2) are defined in a similar manner. The Adj. GETR (CETR) is the difference between GETR (CETR) and the average GETR (CETR) of benchmark firms 
that are neither principal customers nor dependent suppliers in the same year. We require that the incumbent supplier and the benchmark firms must belong to the 
same size and GETR (CETR) quintiles in the same industry. All tests are carried out in two sub-groups depending on whether the effective tax rates of customers 
are higher or lower than the industry median in year t–3. We include the same set of control variables as those reported in Table 2. Detailed definitions of all other 
variables for suppliers are defined in Appendix III. In all specifications, we control for relationship fixed effects and year fixed effects. The t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on standard errors clustered at the relationship level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for 
two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier  
GETR 
 Supplier  
CETR 
 
Supplier 
Adj. GETR 
 Supplier  
Adj. CETR 
 
(1) 
Customer GETR 
<Industry Med. 
(2) 
Customer GETR 
>Industry Med. 
 (3) 
Customer CETR 
<Industry Med. 
(4) 
Customer CETR 
>Industry Med. 
 
(5) 
Customer GETR 
<Industry Med. 
(6) 
Customer GETR 
>Industry Med. 
 (7) 
Customer CETR 
<Industry Med. 
(8) 
Customer CETR 
>Industry Med. 
Year(t–1)  -0.002 0.001  -0.004 -0.005  0.005 -0.005  -0.005 0.004 
  (-0.70) (0.17)  (-0.67) (-1.19)  (0.78) (-0.43)  (-0.41) (0.36) 
Year(t)  -0.014*** -0.002  -0.007 -0.001  -0.013 0.009  -0.003 0.008 
  (-2.93) (-0.57)  (-0.98) (-0.20)  (-1.53) (0.66)  (-0.25) (0.53) 
Year(t+1)  -0.021*** 0.000  -0.020** -0.001  -0.020* 0.011  -0.023* 0.000 
  (-5.07) (0.12)  (-2.13) (-0.29)  (-1.69) (0.83)  (-1.77) (0.00) 
Year(t+2)  -0.037*** 0.001  -0.021** 0.003  -0.026*** 0.001  -0.038** 0.003 
  (-7.64) (0.21)  (-2.23) (0.78)  (-2.96) (0.05)  (-2.55) (0.14) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Relationship Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  5351 2415  3635 1659  5351 2415  3635 1659 
Adjusted R-squared   0.639 0.625  0.414 0.547  0.530 0.377  0.333 0.298 
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